By Jean-Francois Amyot
Standfirst: Tokenization makes it easy to create a digital record of ownership and to move that record. It does not, by itself, create anyone who wants to buy it. Liquidity — a willing buyer, at a fair price, when a holder wants to sell — is a market, not a minting function, and it has to be built, regulated and earned separately from the token itself.
Issuance and trading are two different jobs
Much of the confusion around tokenized assets comes from treating two different jobs as one.
The first job is issuance: creating the security, defining the rights it carries, recording who owns it, and delivering it to the first buyer. Tokenization can genuinely improve parts of that job. A distributed ledger can hold the ownership record, update it when a transfer is recorded, and, in some designs, settle delivery and payment together.
The second job is trading: what happens months later, when a holder who bought in the issuance — or bought from someone else — wants to sell, and someone else has to want to buy, at a price both sides accept, through a venue the law permits, with enough information available for the buyer to judge what the thing is worth.
A minting process solves the first job. It says nothing, on its own, about the second. A token can be perfectly issued, perfectly recorded, and perfectly transferable as a piece of technology, and still have no buyer on the day its holder needs one. That is not a failure of the blockchain. It is the normal condition of most securities that have ever existed, and tokenization does not repeal it.
What liquidity actually requires
Strip the word down to what a holder experiences, and liquidity needs at least five things at the same time.
A buyer. Not interest, not a waitlist, not trading volume in a different asset — a specific counterparty willing to pay for this security, in this size, now.
A price both sides can test. A fair price is not a number an issuer announces. It is a number formed where bids and offers meet, supported by disclosure a buyer can rely on to decide what the security is worth. Without current, credible information about the issuer and the rights the token carries, a buyer either stays away or demands a steep discount for the uncertainty. Either outcome is illiquidity in practice, whatever the token’s technical transferability.
A lawful place to trade. A tokenized security is still a security. As the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff stated on January 28, 2026, the format in which a security is issued does not affect the application of the federal securities laws. Secondary trading therefore needs a lawful route — a registered exchange, a regulated alternative trading system, a specific exemption, or another structure the law actually provides — not merely a website or a smart contract that can match orders.
Permission to resell. Many securities are restricted before any market question arises. The SEC’s investor guidance on private placements is blunt: an investment in a private placement is highly illiquid, an investor will most likely be holding restricted securities, may have difficulty finding a buyer when resale is permitted, and may need to hold the securities indefinitely. The SEC’s guidance on private secondary markets makes the same structural point: securities issued in exempt offerings are often illiquid and may not be freely traded, restricted securities typically bear a legend noting their resale limitations, and a resale still needs its own legal pathway. Tokenizing a restricted security does not remove the restriction. The legend travels with the security, whatever form the record takes.
Someone willing to stand in the middle. In functioning markets, liquidity is rarely just buyers and sellers arriving at the same moment by chance. Intermediaries — brokers, dealers and, in newer on-chain designs, liquidity providers — quote prices, hold inventory and absorb the gap between a seller who wants to exit today and a buyer who arrives next week. That service costs money and carries risk, which is why it does not appear automatically, and why it disappears first when a market is stressed.
Remove any one of those five, and what remains may look like a market on a screen — a token, a price chart, a transfer button — without being a market a holder can actually sell into.
The Innovation Exemption proves the point
The SEC’s own recent work illustrates how much structure a real secondary market requires, even on-chain.
On September 17, 2026, the Commission issued its Innovation Exemption for trading tokenized National Market System stock: a temporary, conditional order that, among other things, exempts qualifying Tokenized Securities Venues from the definition of an exchange and exempts qualifying liquidity providers from the definition of a dealer for specified activity in a venue’s automated market maker liquidity pool. The relief is time-limited, the venues are permissioned, access is subject to standards, and the framework is for secondary trading — it permits no primary issuance on those venues, and offers and sales must still be registered or made under an exemption.
Read that design as a lesson, not just a headline. If liquidity followed automatically from tokenization, none of that architecture would be necessary: no venue category, no conditions, no dedicated liquidity-provider relief, no expiry date for the Commission to reconsider what it has learned. The order exists precisely because a trading market is a regulated structure with participants performing defined roles — including the unglamorous role of providing liquidity — and not a property a token acquires when it is created.
The SEC Investor Advisory Committee made the matching investor-protection point in its March 12, 2026 recommendation on tokenization of equity securities: reforms should not compromise mandatory disclosure, regulated oversight of intermediaries, or a requirement that trading seek to ensure investors receive the best terms for their orders. Best execution, disclosure and supervised intermediaries are not decorations added to a liquid market. They are part of what makes a market trustworthy enough to be liquid at all.
Fractional is not the same as liquid
One claim deserves separate treatment, because it is so often used as a shortcut past this whole discussion: that dividing an asset into smaller, cheaper pieces creates liquidity by creating more potential buyers.
Smaller pieces can widen the possible audience. They do not widen the willing audience by themselves. A fraction of an illiquid asset is a smaller piece of the same illiquidity: the same disclosure questions, the same resale restrictions, the same need for a venue and a counterparty, now divided among more holders, each holding a piece too small, in many cases, to justify the cost of diligencing it. Access and liquidity are different virtues. A structure can honestly deliver the first without delivering the second, and it should say which one it is delivering.
The same caution applies to trading hours. A ledger that can record a transfer at any hour does not ensure a buyer is awake, funded and willing at that hour, or that the price formed in a thin overnight pool reflects anything more than the last small trade. Continuous transferability is a property of the record. Continuous liquidity is a property of the market. Confusing the two is how holders discover, at the worst moment, that “you can sell any time” meant only that the button would be there.
Five questions to ask before believing a liquidity claim
1. Where, exactly, would I sell? Name the venue or mechanism — not “on-chain” in general, but the specific market, its regulatory status, and who is permitted to trade there.
2. Who is obliged — or at least committed — to buy or to quote? Is there a market maker or liquidity provider with actual obligations or commitments, and what are they? If the answer is “other investors,” there is no liquidity arrangement; there is a hope.
3. What restricts my resale? Is the security restricted, for how long, under what legend and transfer controls, and what exemption would a resale rely on? A token that contractually or legally cannot move has no liquidity, whatever its technology allows.
4. What information will a future buyer have? Current financial disclosure, the rights the token carries, custody and record arrangements — the material a stranger needs to price the security. No information, no bid, or only a discounted one.
5. What has actually traded? Real secondary volume in this security, between unrelated parties, at prices that were reported — not issuance volume, not transfers between affiliated wallets, and not a price for a different, more liquid asset the token is said to resemble.
A project that can answer those five questions in documents is talking about a market. A project that answers them with the minting process is talking about issuance, and calling it by the wrong name.
Tokenization may, over time, support deeper and cheaper markets for assets that today trade rarely, if at all — through better records, faster settlement, supervised venues and genuine liquidity provision, built deliberately. That is a serious, worthwhile prospect. It will arrive, where it arrives, because someone built the market: the disclosure, the venue, the intermediaries and the buyer base. It will not arrive because someone minted the token. Issuance is the beginning of a security’s life. Liquidity is what other people decide, later, that it is worth — and no smart contract can decide that for them.
This article is education, not legal or investment advice. Whether a particular tokenized security can be resold, where it may trade, and what restrictions apply turn on its specific terms, its offering exemption and the rules of any venue involved. Investors and issuers should confirm their position with qualified securities counsel in every jurisdiction involved — in Canada, that includes provincial regulators such as Quebec’s Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) and the Ontario Securities Commission alongside U.S. federal law where U.S. securities or investors are involved.
Jean-Francois Amyot is an independent journalist and author of The Art of War Remastered.
